The Prince - 07

are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are
proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and
firm.


CHAPTER XX.
ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,
ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their
subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid
themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning
of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown
and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on
all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those
states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as
comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.
2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your
subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they
quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm
them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character
already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient
to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects.
Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has
always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a
prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old
one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those
who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time
and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters
should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state
shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.
3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This
may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for
to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;
rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always
assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The
Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although
they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these
disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one
party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,
therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be
permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the
more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but
if war comes this policy proves fallacious.
4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes
enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may
have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,
as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many
consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with
craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed
it, his renown may rise higher.
5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and
assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were
distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo
Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been
distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak
generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will only say
this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom have been
hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support
themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they
will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as
they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad
impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince always
extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too
much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands
it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours
has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which
induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural
affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then
he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for
it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons
for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern
affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends
of those men who were contented under the former government, and are
therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it,
were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.
6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states
more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit
to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of
refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been
made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in
our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello
so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on
returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia,
razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that province, and
considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the
Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,
therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you
good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be
reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than
from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear
from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The
castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make,
more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the
state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by
the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they
will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be
wanting foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you.
It has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use
to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli,[1] when the Count
Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to
withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and
thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that
time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses
were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her,
and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore,
it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have
been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these
things considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as
well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them,
cares little about being hated by the people.
[1] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia
Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that
Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the
countess announces the appointment: “I have been with the signori,”
wrote Fortunati, “to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me
that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary
to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me at once.” _Cf_. “Catherine
Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.


CHAPTER XXI.
HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and
setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the
present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he
has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be
the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds
you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the
beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the
foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without
any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile
occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;
thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power
and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and
of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the
foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.
Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater
schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and
clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable
example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,
he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his
achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the
minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the
issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of
the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against
him.
Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal
affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da
Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life
doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some
method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about.
And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action
to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.
A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he
declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course
will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two
of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character
that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In
either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare
yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if
you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the
conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want
doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in
hand, court his fate.
Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out
the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the
Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the
Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed
in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged
them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that
which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your
state not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous;
because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or
consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror.” Thus it will always
happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality,
whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with
arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, generally
follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a prince
declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with
whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful
and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is
established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to
become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all
are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard,
especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you
may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you
become companions on a fortune that may rise again.
In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it
greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of
one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved
him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with
your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be
noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with
one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others,
unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers
you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as
possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with
France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their
ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as
happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to
attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince
ought to favour one of the parties.
Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in
knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to
take the lesser evil.
A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour
the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his
citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and
agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not
be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken
away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but
the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things
and designs in any way to honour his city or state.
Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles
at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into
guilds or into societies,[1] he ought to hold such bodies in esteem,
and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of
courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty
of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.
[1] “Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” “Arti” were craft or
trade guilds, _cf_. Florio: “Arte . . . a whole company of any trade
in any city or corporation town.” The guilds of Florence are most
admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject
(Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called
“artel,” exist in Russia to-day, _cf_. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s
“Russia,” ed. 1905: “The sons . . . were always during the working
season members of an artel. In some of the larger towns there are
artels of a much more complex kind— permanent associations, possessing
large capital, and pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the
individual members.” The word “artel,” despite its apparent
similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with “ars”
or “arte.” Its root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by
an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only another form of
“rota,” which now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the
underlying idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu”
were possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included
individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or
“clans” would be most appropriate.


CHAPTER XXII.
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they
are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the
first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is
by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to
recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error
which he made was in choosing them.
There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first
is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the
first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know
good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have
the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his
servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the
servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you
ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in
his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,
and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not
concerned.
On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with
him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he
cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,
many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him
dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,
are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,
the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.


CHAPTER XXIII.
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it
is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless
they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of
whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with
difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they
run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way
of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell
you the truth, respect for you abates.
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,
and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and
listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With
these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be
steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either
overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions
that he falls into contempt.
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of
affairs to Maximilian,[1] the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,
said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.
This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the
above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his
designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in
carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at
once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being
pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he
does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he
wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.
[1] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman
Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after
her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian
politics.
A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every
one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to
be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning
the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any
consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be
felt.
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good
advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived,
because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not
wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has
yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very
prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would
not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take
away his state from him.
But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to
unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,
and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through
them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always
prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.
Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they
come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the
prince from good counsels.


CHAPTER XXIV.
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince
to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and
fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the
actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an
hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men
and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more
by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good
they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost
defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will
be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and
adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and
with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a
prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.
And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and
others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in
regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the
people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known
how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that
have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who
was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the
greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a
warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles,
he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the
end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the
kingdom.
Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own
sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a
change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the
calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they
thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that
the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would
recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very
bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would
never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later
on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does,
it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no
avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable,
certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.


CHAPTER XXV.
WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by
fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us
believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let
chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times
because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may
still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.
Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true
that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[1] but that she
still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.