The Prince - 02

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HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE
ACQUIRED

All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been
and are either republics or principalities.
Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long
established; or they are new.
The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the
prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
the King of Spain.
Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of
the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.


CHAPTER II.
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another
place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to
principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,
and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary
states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than
new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of
his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,
for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless
he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if
he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to
the usurper, he will regain it.
We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius
in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the
hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it
happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices
cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects
will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and
duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are
lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.


CHAPTER III.
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be
not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from
an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for
men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and
this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein
they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common
necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
which he must put upon his new acquisition.
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,
feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed
forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
of the natives.
For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the
gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in
the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time
it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[1] to raise insurrections on the
borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to
bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be
defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above
mentioned.
[1] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who
married Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and
died in 1510.
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains
to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and
what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself
more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.
Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold
them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government;
and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of
the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in
other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will
live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,
and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has
only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of
their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws
nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will
become entirely one body with the old principality.
But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside
there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has
made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other
measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled
there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the
spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are
great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied
by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have
more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He
who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
from him with the greatest difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious
ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man
ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state,
so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where
they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And
the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner
enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the
hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to
those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over
to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he
has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold
of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces,
and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of
them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does
not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired,
and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and
troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with[2]
the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make
them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because
the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,
who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it
is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the
medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable;
for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic
fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but
difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either
detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but
difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the
evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise
man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not
having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that
every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the
Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to
avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war
is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of
others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in
Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided
both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which
is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the
benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and
prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring
with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.
[2] See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”
But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[3] (and not of Charles)[4] as
the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain
a state composed of divers elements.
[3] Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,
died 1515.
[4] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I
will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a
foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every
door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to
accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have
succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not
made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,
regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of
Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of
Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,
the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,
which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
the king master of two-thirds of Italy.
Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could
have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although
they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been
forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have
made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no
sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to
occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was
weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had
thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by
adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater
authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was
himself forced to come into Italy.
And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter
in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country
and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and
whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he
drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out
in turn.
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is
folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with
her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she
ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with
the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she
got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had
not the excuse of that necessity.
Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did
not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to
injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from
the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought
Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to
humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have
kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would
never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also
because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
have had the courage.
And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given
above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,
because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king
had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in
exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[5] and for the cap to
Rouen,[6] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the
faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.
[5] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and
married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to
retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.
[6] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a
cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that
is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope
Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I
replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning
that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the
Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin
may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which
never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming
powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about
either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
who has been raised to power.


CHAPTER IV.
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL
AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was
scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole
empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained
themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose
among themselves from their own ambitions.
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to
be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of
servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity
by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons
have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and
hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a
prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,
because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as
superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as
to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular
affection.
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into
sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and
changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the
midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,
and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king
take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both
of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state
of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The
causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that
the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can
he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the
lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his
ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with
great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when
they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them,
for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in
mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his
own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has
been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot
replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this
prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the
others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not
rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,
for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men,
for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the
victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with
infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from
those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves
the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either
to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings
the opportunity.
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and
therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him
in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which
victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,
for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would
have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults
raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.
But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities
there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed
away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting
afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself
his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed
there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other
than the Romans were acknowledged.
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which
others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;
this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.


CHAPTER V.
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three
courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the
next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live
under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an
oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a
government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand
without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support
him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will
hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other
way.
There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they
lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as
the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did
not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities
in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them
otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city
accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be
destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of
liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do
or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges
unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been
held in bondage by the Florentines.
But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and
his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to
obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in
making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern
themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a
prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But
in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire
for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of
their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them
or to reside there.


CHAPTER VI.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND
ABILITY

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,
and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely
to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A
wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to
imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not
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