The Prince - 03

equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the
clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far
distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow
attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their
strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of
so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.
I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a
new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station
presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of
these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
other state, is compelled to reside there in person.
But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,
have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus,
and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not
discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet
he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy
to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have
acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their
particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be
found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.
And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed
anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material
to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that
opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and
without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of
Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that
they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of
bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and
that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of
the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace.
Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians
dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate,
and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity
whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.
Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for
enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on
their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily
believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.
Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the
opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others
defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along
with them.
It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In
the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass
anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they
are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have
conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it
is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that
persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by
force.
If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to
Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no
means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the
unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties
in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the
ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are
overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated,
they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards
powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.
To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some
resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like
kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[1] This man rose from a private
station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to
fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him
for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their
prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one
who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.
This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old
alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on
such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had
endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.
[1] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.


CHAPTER VII.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF
OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they
have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state
is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as
happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might
hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those
emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens
came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the
fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable
things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;
because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not
reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having
always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it
because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.
States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
correspondencies[1] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps,
and that those foundations, which others have laid _before_ they became
princes, they must lay _afterwards_.
[1] “Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and
correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of
“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.
Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and
these are Francesco Sforza[2] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper
means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be
Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties
he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called
by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy
of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he
had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise
and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and
fortunes of others had bestowed on him.
[2] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria
Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan,
on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli
was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia
(1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to the assassinations
of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and along with his letters to
his chiefs in Florence he has left an account, written ten years
before _The Prince_, of the proceedings of the duke in his
“Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare
Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended to the
present work.
Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations
may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be
laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be
seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not
consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what
better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;
and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but
the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.
Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see
his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the
Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke
of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini
were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he
saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been
assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope,
namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved
him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers,
so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was
easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other
reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not
only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving
the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy
with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He
was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the
attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the
king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the
Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was
hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to
him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that
the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him,
that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might
themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the
same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and
attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And
as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the
Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from
that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the
arms and the luck of others.
For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in
Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,
making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to
their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that
in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned
entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the
Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came
to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length
that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them,
called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the
rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless
dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the
French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by
trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse
to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the
mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with
all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the
Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his
power at Sinigalia.[3] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned
their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good
foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of
Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he
gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice,
and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.
[3] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.
When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave
them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was
full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it
necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer
Ramiro d’Orco,[4] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest
power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the
greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not
advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the
country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their
advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some
hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the
people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if
any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in
the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took
Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the
piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The
barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied
and dismayed.
[4] Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.
But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding
himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate
dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great
measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if
he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,
for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would
not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and
to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards
the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta.
It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would
have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.
Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future
he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church
might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which
Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by
exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as
to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to
himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope
with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the
college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before
the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first
shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had
accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords
as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the
Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And
as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany,
for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his
protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French
were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and
in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down
upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through
hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines
would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was
prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much
power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer
have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his
own power and ability.
But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He
left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the
rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and
he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the
foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not
had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he
would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his
foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a
month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst
the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they
could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope
him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not
have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of
Alexander,[5] everything would have been different to him. On the day
that Julius the Second[6] was elected, he told me that he had thought
of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had
provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that,
when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.
[5] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.
[6] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad
Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.
When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to
offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of
others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and
far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and
only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness
frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to
secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome
either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the
people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate
those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of
things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to
destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship
with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal
and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the
actions of this man.
Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he
made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope
to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected
Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any
cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they
became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom
he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,
San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[7] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear
him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their
relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the
kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above
everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,
failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad
Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages
to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his
choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.
[7] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.


CHAPTER VIII.
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither
of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is
manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be
more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are
when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the
principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private
person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first
method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other
modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these
two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.
Agathocles, the Sicilian,[1] became King of Syracuse not only from a
private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a
potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous
life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of
mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession,
he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established
in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself
prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that
which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding
for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army,
was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the
senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating
to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the
senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held
the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And although he
was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not
only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for
its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time
raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme
necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,
leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.
[1] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.
Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will
see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as
he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any
one, but step by step in the military profession, which steps were
gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly
held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent
to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith,
without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not
glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and
extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his
greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming hardships, it cannot be
seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain.
Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite
wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent
men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or genius.
In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da
Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by
his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his
youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his
discipline, he might attain some high position in the military
profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,
and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body
and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing a
paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some
citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than
its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So
he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away from home for many
years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some measure to look
upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire
anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he
had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would
be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and
he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably
by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also
to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.
Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,
and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he
lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having
arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual
in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son
Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and
others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to
be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a
chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after
him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued from secret places
and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto,
mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief
magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to
obey him, and to form a government, of which he made himself the
prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and
strengthened himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a
way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only
was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all
his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as
that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by
Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia,
as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this