The Prince - 04

parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made
his leader in valour and wickedness.
Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his
country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be
conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by
means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold
the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this
follows from severities[2] being badly or properly used. Those may be
called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well, that are
applied at one blow and are necessary to one’s security, and that are
not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage
of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding
they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than
decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God
or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is
impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.
[2] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern
equivalent of Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than
the more obvious “cruelties.”
Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought
to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for
him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to
repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to
reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does
otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to
keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor
can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and
repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so
that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given
little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.
And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall
make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled
times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help
you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be
under any obligation to you for them.


CHAPTER IX.
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil
principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain
to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the
favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties
are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be
ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and
oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in
cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or
anarchy.
A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the
nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that
under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of
one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his
authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles
maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the
aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around
him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can
neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches
sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around
him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is
more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added
also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,
because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect
from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile
nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will
rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and
astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain
favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is
compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well
without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and
to give or take away authority when it pleases him.
Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape
their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or
they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought
to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.
But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it
is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,
and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they
were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.
Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only
ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the
people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they
receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more
closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more
devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their
favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as
these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,
so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the
people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.
Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was
only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this
would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not
let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who
builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a
private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that
the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the
magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as
happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in
Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,
who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who
does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and
energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find
himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his
foundations well.
[1] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus
in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.
[2] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s
“Florentine History,” Book III.
These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either
rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their
government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and
who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with
great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not
the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the
citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates,
are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will
always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For
such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when
citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with
him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to
die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its
citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this
experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore
a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will
always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state
and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.


CHAPTER X.
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO
BE MEASURED

It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in
case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether
he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite
clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by
their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise
a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack
them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot
show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to
defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been
discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second
case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country.
And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the
other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often
repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are
always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it
will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town
well fortified, and is not hated by his people.
The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits
them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them,
because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the
taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they
have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they
always keep in public depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking,
and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss
to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the
community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city,
and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold
military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to
uphold them.
Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only
be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this
world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a
whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever
should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it
burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and
self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that
a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by
giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for
long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving
himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.
Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot
and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the
prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the
damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer
any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with
their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that
their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his
defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they
confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is
well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the
minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not
fail to support and defend them.


CHAPTER XI.
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching
which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they
are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held
without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of
religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the
principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live.
These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have
subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are
not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care,
and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate
themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being
upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak
no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would
be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.
Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church
has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from
Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have
been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)
have valued the temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France
trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and
to ruin the Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not
appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.
Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[1] this country was
under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;
the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those
about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.
To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as
it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made
use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini
and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with
arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate
weak and powerless. And although there might arise sometimes a
courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could
rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also a
cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a
pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to
speak, one people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would
arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet
would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the
temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in Italy.
[1] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.
Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have
ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things
which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although
his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,
nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,
which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all
his labours.
Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all
the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the
chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the
way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been
practised before Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only
followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin
the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these
enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,
inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any
private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within
the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them
some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:
the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and
the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused
the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their
cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster
the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to
support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders
and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope
Leo[2] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,
if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more
venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.
[2] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.


CHAPTER XII.
HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.
We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to
ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good
laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are
well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the
discussion and shall speak of the arms.
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful,
valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the
fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so
long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war
by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for
keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to
make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your
soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble
to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by
resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they
formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that
Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in
hand;[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the
truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have
related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who
have also suffered the penalty.
[1] “With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the _bons mots_
of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII seized
Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his
quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the
country. _Cf_. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King
Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a
kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy
without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont
to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands,
to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.”
I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,
you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are
ruined in the usual way.
And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted
to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in
person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its
citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it
ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so
that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes
and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and
mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to
bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its
citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and
Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely
armed and quite free.
Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
liberty.
Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,[2]
allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His
father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[3] of Naples, left
her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms
of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the
Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these
arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have
defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been
favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have
stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and
others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer
was Giovanni Acuto,[4] and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot
be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the
Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the
Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco
turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while
ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most
prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest
renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have
been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became
the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if
they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their
achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and
gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed
gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned
to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they
forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the
beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much
territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to
fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under
Carmignuola,[5] they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him
a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership),
and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they
feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they
were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to
lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order
to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their
captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of
Pitigliano,[6] and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not
gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,[7] where in one battle they lost
that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much
trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed
and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
[2] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.
[3] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.
[4] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John
Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was knighted by
Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops and went into
Italy. These became the famous “White Company.” He took part in many
wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible
Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of
Bernabo Visconti.
[5] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,
executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.
[6] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San
Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria,
in 1487. “Primo capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano;
Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.
[7] Battle of Vaila in 1509.
And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired
more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more
states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms
against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were